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Abstract 
Do Bank Bailouts Work? The Effect of Reconstruction Finance Corporation Aid during 
the Crisis of 1933 
 
 
Do bank bailouts work?  Government aid initiatives implemented to stem the 
current crisis raise important questions about the role of monetary policy in preventing 
bank failures.  The scale of this bailout program defies comparison with any other aid 
package implemented in the post-World War II period.  Fortunately, the operations of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) during the Great Depression provide a 
historical experiment to examine the effects of government rescue programs on financial 
institutions. 
This paper examines the effects of the RFC’s loan and preferred stock programs 
on bank failure rates during the crisis of 1933.  Using a new database on Michigan banks, 
I employ survival analysis to examine the effectiveness of the RFC’s loan program and 
preferred stock purchases on bank failure rates.  My analysis suggests that the loan 
program increased the failure rates of banks during the crisis by increasing the 
indebtedness of financial institutions.  Conversely, I find that the RFC’s purchases of 
preferred stock increased the chances that a bank survived the financial crisis.  Injections 
of capital helped repair the balance sheets of banks and restored confidence in the 
financial system.  Ultimately, this historical experiment provides some insight into how 
government aid programs might curtail banking crises. 
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Introduction 
The recent financial crisis raises serious questions about the role of monetary 
policy and regulation in managing banking crises.  The failure of several important 
financial institutions, including Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers, demonstrates how 
the fall of a few key financial intermediaries can freeze credit markets.  The waves of 
bank failures that occurred in the fall of 2008 illustrated that systemic turmoil threatens 
strong banks as well as weaker institutions.  Indeed, many scholars believe that banking 
crises can have serious economic effects.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963), for example, 
argue that bank failures extend economic downturns by reducing the money supply and 
decreasing the wealth of bank stockholders.  Bernanke (1983), on the other hand, focuses 
on the economic costs of financial disintermediation.1  He finds that bank failures reduce 
the supply of credit, which limits the ability of households and small businesses to 
borrow.  Consequently, a financial crisis can significantly reduce aggregate demand.     
Although the government has responded to the banking crisis by extending loans 
or buying stock in many beleaguered financial institutions, it is unclear whether these 
policies will be effective.  Fortunately, history provides an experiment to examine the 
effects of a government rescue program on the health of financial institutions.  The 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was a government-sponsored enterprise 
founded to stem bank failures and reduce the economic costs of financial 
disintermediation.  The RFC was originally established to lend funds to troubled firms.  
However, after the crisis of 1933, the Corporation directly recapitalized banks by 
purchasing preferred stock.  The program cost approximately $200 billion in current U.S. 
                                                 
1 Disintermediation refers to the withdrawal of funds from intermediary financial institutions such as banks. 
 3
dollars (Lohr 2008).  When the RFC ceased operations in the early 1950s, the 
government-sponsored entity sold its preferred stock and recovered the funds provided by 
taxpayers.   
This paper examines the effects of the RFC’s loan and preferred stock programs 
on bank failure rates during the crisis of 1933.  Using a new database on Michigan banks 
collected from primary sources, I employ survival analysis to examine the effectiveness 
of the government’s loan program and preferred stock purchases on bank survival and 
failure rates.  Michigan banks were selected because Michigan’s statewide banking crisis 
precipitated the national financial crisis of 1933 (Kennedy 1973).  The prevalence of 
bank failures during this crisis provides a rich data set for my study, and illustrates the 
economic and historical importance of financial crises. 
My analysis suggests that the government loan program increased the failure rates 
of banks during the crisis of 1933 by increasing the indebtedness of financial institutions.  
Conversely, I find that government purchases of preferred stock increased the chances 
that a bank survived the financial crisis.  Injections of capital helped repair the balance 
sheets of banks and restored confidence in the financial system.  Ultimately, I believe that 
this historical experiment provides some insight into the effects of the government loan 
and preferred stock programs in stemming the spread of a banking crisis. 
Section I describes the RFC’s aid programs during the Great Depression, as well 
as the banking crisis in Detroit.  This is followed by a discussion of the role of the Detroit 
banking crisis in the March 1933 national bank holiday, the Emergency Banking Act of 
1933, and the change in the RFC’s mandate from lending to recapitalizing banks.  Section 
II surveys the relevant literature, introducing the theoretical background for an empirical 
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model of bank failure.  Section III tests whether the RFC reduced bank failure rates.  
Section IV discusses the implications of this historical experiment for the current 
economic crisis.  
Section I: History of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
Herbert Hoover established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) on 
February 2, 19322.  The RFC was originally established to stimulate the economy by 
increasing liquidity in the financial system by loaning funds to troubled financial 
institutions.  The RFC was an agency of the executive branch of the federal government 
that had the ability to increase its lending capacity and oversight powers by executive 
order.  Its operations did not depend on Congressional approval (Mason 2003). 
During the Great Depression, the RFC conducted four major aid programs: a loan 
program for financial institutions, a preferred stock program for financial institutions, a 
railroad loan program, and a commercial and industrial loan program3.  The loan program 
for financial institutions was the first program initiated by the RFC.  While the RFC 
charter permitted the Corporation to make loans with maturities of up to three years, most 
loans had maturities of less than six months.  The short duration of the loans increased 
                                                 
2 This history of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is based on Mason (2001b). 
3 The RFC’s railroad loan program, like its bank loan program, was part of the original RFC Act.  
However, unlike its loans to banks, the RFC’s railroad loans did not need to be fully secured.  The RFC 
also lent to railroads at below market rates.  As a result of these lax lending polices, the RFC’s railroad loan 
program was abused, and funds were used for the benefit of railroad company insiders (Mason 2001b). 
The commercial and industrial loan program was the final economic stimulation program 
undertaken by the RFC during the Great Depression.  Because the banks had ceased lending, the RFC made 
loans directly to businesses.  The RFC encouraged banks to purchase the right to participate in commercial 
and industrial loans instead of originating the loans themselves in order to stimulate private sector lending. 
However, during the Great Depression, consumers were not increasing their demand for goods or 
services.  As a result, no businesses needed to invest in additional capacity.  The commercial and industrial 
loan program therefore had little impact on the economy. 
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the RFC’s influence over borrowers because the Corporation was prohibited from 
renewing loans if the directors failed to follow RFC guidelines. 
The RFC used its loan program to gain control of the management of troubled 
banks.  Institutions receiving loans were required to limit the compensation of directors, 
officers, and employees.  Indeed, the RFC would not make or extend a loan to a bank 
whose workers received excessively generous compensation.  The RFC also demanded 
that banks that received loans agreed to limit the salary of employees for the life of the 
loan. 
RFC loans to banks charged a higher interest rate than loans from the Federal 
Reserve’s discount window.  The higher interest rates insured that the RFC did not crowd 
out private sector investment; instead, the RFC provided banks with necessary funds at a 
penalty rate.4  The mandate that banks initiate the assistance process, not the government 
or RFC officials, further ensured that the RFC did not crowd out private investors. 
The degree of control the RFC exercised over bank management, its high interest 
rates, and the fact that banks needed to initiate the lending process all discouraged 
financial institutions from using the RFC’s loan program.  According to James Olson 
(1972), the RFC’s strict conditions brought “more problems than solutions.”  Most 
importantly, onerous collateral requirements required banks to use their most liquid assets 
to secure RFC funds.  As a result, banks were unable to accommodate any emergency 
withdrawals by depositors (Olson 1977, Mason 2001a).    Econometric analysis of the 
loan program also suggests that the program was too conservative to end bank failures 
(Mason 2001a). 
                                                 
4 The loan program of the RFC recalls Bagehot’s Rule, which suggests that very large loans at very high 
rates are the best remedy for distressed banks. 
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To correct the flaws of the loan program, the RFC moved from a policy designed 
primarily to increase liquidity to one directly addressing the shortage of bank capital.  On 
March 9, 1933, Congress passed the Emergency Banking Relief Act, altering the original 
mandate of the RFC to permit the government-sponsored entity to purchase preferred 
stock in financial institutions.5  RFC preferred stock was senior to common stock upon 
liquidation of a bank.  After the issuance of the RFC’s preferred stock, all other stock 
dividends were limited.  The bank’s remaining earnings were placed in a fund which 
would eventually be used to buy back the RFC’s preferred stock.  Finally, RFC preferred 
stock carried voting rights that gave it the power to institute changes that would increase 
the solvency and profitability of a bank. 
The RFC’s control of financial institutions through the preferred stock program 
discouraged banks from participating.  Banks were also worried that participating in the 
aid program would make them seem weak, causing depositors and shareholders to lose 
confidence and withdraw their funds from banks.  As a result, widespread participation in 
the preferred stock program occurred only when the FDIC began backing the deposits in 
solvent banks6.  Managers of strong and weak banks alike sold preferred stock to the RFC 
in order to protect the identities of the institutions which were too weak to join the FDIC 
without additional investment.  As a result, the RFC eventually owned more than one-
third of the capital of American banks (Mason 2001b).  Ultimately, econometric analysis 
                                                 
5 Emergency Banking Relief Act, Section 304.  73rd Congress, 1933. 
6 According to Jesse Jones (1951), the chairman of the RFC, more than 5,000 banks which had previously 
claimed to be solvent “required considerable added capital to make them [sufficiently] sound” to join the 
FDIC (p. 27).  Jones personally appealed to the managers of all banks to join the RFC’s stock program “so 
that depositors would not be induced to switch out of …banks when their names were published” (p. 26-
27).  Thanks to the preferred stock program, the weaker banks were adequately recapitalized and all but 
141 of approximately 14,500 American banks joined the FDIC in 1934 (FDIC). 
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suggests that recapitalizing the banks stabilized the banking sector, although the program 
did not increase lending (Mason 2001a).  
The promising programs and immense resources of the RFC subjected the agency 
to political pressure and public scrutiny. State and federal politicians, recognizing the 
benefits of RFC aid, often pressured the government-sponsored enterprise to grant 
assistance to their constituents.  Concerns about the RFC’s accountability led to an 
amendment publicizing the names of its aid beneficiaries.  Overall, records of the aid 
distributed by the RFC suggest the Corporation was unbiased in its lending policies 
(Mason 2003).  Political bias was mitigated by three main factors.  First, the loans made 
by the RFC to financial institutions had to be fully and adequately secured.7  This 
restriction was also incorporated into the RFC’s credit and capital programs, which 
ensured that aid recipients were good candidates for recovery.  Second, the RFC was 
funded as a government-owned corporation with an initial appropriation from Congress 
and capital subsidies from the Treasury.  The managers of the RFC relied upon this 
capital base rather than regular Congressional appropriations, which freed the RFC’s 
managers from political pressure.  Finally, RFC aid decisions were made at the regional 
level; each region’s field office was largely independent from the others and immune to 
political influences. 
A notable exception to the RFC’s usual political independence occurred in 
February 1933 when Michigan Senator James J. Couzens pressured the RFC to lend to 
the Guardian Detroit Bank.  The Guardian Detroit Bank was an important local bank 
holding company, and the RFC offered aid on the condition that Henry Ford agreed to 
                                                 
7 The RFC did not specify the level of collateral that was necessary and only its staff could evaluate 
whether a bank had sufficient assets to secure a loan (Mason 2001b).  
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keep his personal and corporate deposits in the system.  At the time, Ford’s Guardian 
deposits totaled approximately $32.5 million (Awalt 1969).  Ultimately, Ford rejected the 
conditions of the RFC’s loan, precipitating a panic across Michigan and the rest of the 
country (Mason 2003, Butkiewicz 1995). 
Banking Crisis of 1933 
One prominent feature of the Great Depression is the incidence of repeated 
banking crises.  Waves of bank failures occurred in December 1930, March 1931, and 
from November 1932 to February 1933.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and White 
(1984) attribute the Crisis of 1930 to a decline in asset values after the post-World War I 
boom.  The banks that failed during this crisis were similar to banks that failed during the 
1920s.  White (1984) suggests that the 1930 bank failures were simply the result of 
systemic weakness in the U.S. banking system, which depended on smaller independent 
banks rather than larger branching financial institutions. 
Following the Crisis of 1930, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) note an 
improvement in macroeconomic indicators.  However, the Federal Reserve reduced the 
availability of credit, keeping the money supply at its December 1930 level.  In March, a 
second banking crisis began; this crisis was worsened by adverse economic developments 
in Europe. 
From November 1932 to February 1933, banking crises occurred or were 
narrowly avoided through government interventions in Nevada, Wisconsin, 
Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Tennessee, Ohio, Arkansas, Alabama, Missouri, Maryland, 
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Louisiana, and Michigan8.  The banking crisis in Michigan in February 1933 was of 
particular importance; indeed, Kennedy (1973) describes the Michigan banking crisis as a 
“prelude to the national banking disaster three weeks thereafter.”  The turmoil 
experienced in Michigan, the home of the American automobile industry, highlights the 
devastating effects of banking crises on the national economy. 
In Detroit, significant amounts of money began draining from the largest banks 
with the onset of the Great Depression (Awalt 1969).  The Detroit Bankers Company 
Group and the Union Guardian Group, the two major local bank holding companies, were 
under additional pressure because of their banks’ heavy investment in local real estate 
(New York Times 1933a).9  Between 1930 and February 1933, approximately $250 
million was withdrawn from the First National Bank of Detroit; its local competitors, the 
Union Guardian Trust Company and the Guardian National Bank of Detroit, also 
sustained massive withdrawals.  By January 1933, these banks lost between $2.5 million 
and $3 million in deposits each week (Awalt 1969).   
 To meet the demands of its depositors, the Guardian Trust Company requested 
additional funds from the RFC.  Henry Ford had already attempted to bolster the bank’s 
liquidity with a $7 million deposit.  With deposits of approximately $32.5 million in the 
Guardian Banks and an additional $18 million in the Detroit Bankers’ group, Ford had a 
                                                 
8 Kennedy (1973) suggests that RFC loans initially allowed distressed banks to survive runs and 
temporarily stalled the “epidemic” of bank failures and panics.  RFC loans and statewide banking holidays 
postponed the national banking crisis, but by February 1933 the Corporation could not meet the widespread 
demand for its funds. 
9 The Detroit Banks Company Group held the First National Bank of Detroit, Peoples’ Wayne County 
Bank, Detroit Trust Company, eight suburban banks, and a local investment company, the First Detroit 
Company.  The Union Guardian Group, also called the Ford Group, held the National Bank of Commerce, 
Guardian Union Trust Company, and other local banks (Awalt 350).  First National Bank had book assets 
of $485,846,627 and 146 branch offices outside of its main office in Detroit at the time of the crisis; the 
Guardian Union Group held book assets of $432,797,434, nine bank components in Detroit and 11 bank 
branches in other Michigan cities (New York Times 1933b).   
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strong personal incentive to assist the local financial institutions (Awalt 1969).  However, 
Ford’s infusion of cash was not enough to sustain the Guardian Trust Company, and the 
bank requested an additional $60 million from the RFC, which was already lending to a 
number of local banks (New York Times 1933a; New York Times 1933c). 
 As the RFC considered the application of the Guardian Trust Company, Michigan 
Senator James Couzens argued that the bank lacked sufficient collateral to justify a loan10 
(New York Times 1933a).  Couzens asked Henry Ford to grant the government a lien on 
his $7 million deposit, subordinating his claim to that of the RFC.  Ford rejected this plan 
and an alternative plan requiring him to sign a personal note for the difference between 
the bank’s collateral and the amount to be loaned by the RFC.  Contemporary sources 
indicate that the Ford family and company had already advanced local banks $12 million 
and felt further efforts to save the banks were futile (Awalt 1969).  Angered by the 
increasing pressure from government officials to personally recapitalize the struggling 
banks, Ford threatened to withdraw $25 million from the system at the first opportunity.  
Because such a withdrawal would cause a panic and threaten the survival of the local 
banks, Francis Awalt, acting Comptroller of the Currency at the US Treasury, felt 
compelled to prevent the national banks of Detroit from opening (Awalt 1969). 
 While Awalt recognized the need to keep all Michigan banks closed, he had no 
authority to do so.  Instead, federal officials conferred with Michigan Governor William 
A. Comstock, who declared a statewide bank holiday on February 14, 1933.  The holiday 
was originally intended to last eight days (Awalt 1969).  However, the complex problems 
                                                 
10 Couzens and Ford were former business partners in the Ford Motor Company.  Couzens was also the 
chairman of the Senate committee responsible for investigating the RFC’s loans, so his concerns were 
sufficient cause to block the Union Guardian Trust Company’s aid package (New York Times 1933a). 
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plaguing the financial system prompted officials to extend the holiday until March 6 
(Awalt 1969). 
On February 18, soon after the Michigan bank holiday was declared, news 
circulated of a potential merger of the Guardian Trust Company and the Central Hanover 
Bank and Trust Company of New York.  However, “local pride” motivated Detroit 
bankers to reject the assistance of the New York banks.  At the same time, local rivalries 
prevented the mergers of Detroit banks (New York Times 1933d).  On February 24, Henry 
Ford and his son Edsel, a Chairman of the Union Guardian Trust Company, offered to 
provide capital for two new banks to help liquidate the assets of the distressed banks.  
The aid of the Ford family was offered on the condition that they could select the new 
bank directors and officers (Awalt 1969).  Initially, it seemed that the Ford offer, 
accompanied by an additional $20 million from New York bankers and an RFC pledge of 
$54 million, would allow depositors to access at least 35 percent of their deposits 
immediately (Los Angeles Times 1933).  However, the New York bankers withdrew their 
offer because of concerns that they might not have clear legal claim to the failing banks’ 
assets.  The Ford family then withdrew its contribution, and the bailout plan failed (New 
York Times 1933e). 
The effects of the financial crisis were felt acutely in the real economy during the 
weeks between the initial crisis in Detroit and President Roosevelt’s inauguration.  
Detroit was threatened with a milk shortage and grocers were unable to sell food since 
they could not cash checks (New York Times 1933f; New York Times 1933g). Twenty-
eight thousand local families supported by the Detroit Public Welfare Department were 
unable to use their aid checks from the city’s accounts with the Guardian Group and First 
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National; Wayne County, Michigan was unable to support 10,000 ill and insane patients 
because its deposits in the bank groups were unavailable (New York Times 1933g).  In 
late February, the Detroit Clearing House Association considered issuing scrip11 to 
provide a medium of exchange during the banking emergency (New York Times 1933g). 
The situation in Michigan and the concurrent exposure of scandalous business 
practices among New York bankers exacerbated financial instability across the country.  
The instability of the Detroit banking system worried officials in Washington, and the 
public withdrew its deposits from banks nationwide.  Over 5,500 banks with deposits 
totaling $3.4 billion had temporarily closed by March 3.  New York banks lost $200 
million in gold and $150 million in currency; Chicago also lost $100 million in gold the 
same day (Awalt 1969).  The Federal Reserve banks admitted “they could not support 
member banks indefinitely, especially those drained by the troubles in Michigan, 
Maryland, and Ohio” (Kennedy 1973).  However, outgoing President Hoover was 
unwilling to declare a national bank holiday, so comptroller Awalt and other government 
officials pressured the governors of several states to declare state banking holidays and 
institute banking restrictions.  On March 6, the first business day following President 
Roosevelt’s inauguration, he declared a national bank holiday to try to stem the panic. 
On March 9, Congress passed the Emergency Banking Relief Act drafted by 
Roosevelt and his advisors.  The Act granted the federal government power over the 
                                                 
11 Scrip is a certificate of indebtedness issued as currency or in lieu of money (Oxford English Dictionary). 
 13
banking system.12  Under this act, the RFC could directly capitalize banks by purchasing 
preferred stock. 
The Emergency Banking Act of 1933 helped resolve the crisis.  During the 
holiday, government officials confirmed the solvency of national banks, which were 
gradually reopened to their depositors beginning March 13.  Roosevelt’s innovative 
banking plan and first “fireside chat” soothed depositors to such an extent that when 
banks reopened, deposits actually exceeded withdrawals.  Five thousand three hundred 
eighty-seven of the Federal Reserve’s 6,694 member banks reopened by the end of 
March; 7,654 of 11,455 state institutions also reopened during that time.  By June, 91 
percent of deposits in Federal Reserve member banks were available to the public.  
Confidence in the banking system encouraged stock market values to increase; the values 
of government bonds, corporate bonds and commodities also increased (Kennedy 1973). 
After successfully reopening the first set of banks, Roosevelt’s administration 
addressed the long-term capital needs of the banking system.  Through investments made 
by local businessmen and the RFC, the government engineered the direct recapitalization 
of certain weak banks.  The RFC invested more than $1.2 billion in over 6,000 
institutions during its 18 years of operations.13  Ultimately, the agency lost only $13.7 
million and only 206 of the banks which received RFC preferred stock were later forced 
to close (Kennedy 1973).14 
                                                 
12 The Act also contained provisions for reorganizing national banks and issuing preferred stock for banks.  
It formalized lending by the Federal Reserve to banks, and created a Presidential discretionary fund of 
$2,000,000 to help carry out the Act. 
13 Equivalent to approximately $19.5 billion in the year 2008 (Officer, 2009).  
14 Equivalent to approximately $227 million in the year 2008 (Officer, 2009). 
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  In Detroit, the RFC orchestrated a “Spokane sale” of the assets of the banks.15  
General Motors and the RFC announced the creation of a new bank on March 21.  Half 
the capital for this new corporation was provided by the RFC, which received preferred 
stock.  The other half of the necessary capital was provided by local interests, including 
General Motors and Chrysler, which were granted common stock in the company (New 
York Times 1933c).  The RFC supervised the management of this new bank, the National 
Bank of Detroit.   
The National Bank of Detroit immediately took control of the assets and liabilities 
of the Guardian group and the National group.  On April 24, the National Bank of Detroit 
distributed 30 percent of holdings to the old depositors and began liquidating the assets of 
the Guardian and National groups in May.  The efficiency of the RFC’s “Detroit plan” 
spurred numerous applications for reorganization in other communities.  In total, the RFC 
and Treasury Department authorized 257 similar relief operations.  These rehabilitations 
finished the repair begun with the passage of the Emergency Banking Act and allowed 
the financial system to rebuild on stronger foundations following the banking crisis of 
1933. 
                                                 
15 “Spokane sales” were used to dissolve banks who provided valuable services to the community but 
whose assets covered less than half of their debt.  Conservators arranged the sale of “desirable assets in 
bulk…to an existing bank or a bank newly organized for that purpose,” and creditors were immediately 
paid from the revenue generated by the sale (Kennedy 1973).  After the sale and allocation of the proceeds, 
the old banks could be liquidated. 
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Section II: Literature Review 
Conventional studies of financial crises suggest that bank failures worsen 
economic downturns because of their effect on the money supply (Friedman and 
Schwartz 1963).  Banking crises cause the supply of money to decrease as loans are 
recalled and the wealth of bank shareholders decreases.  These monetary effects have a 
detrimental effect on national income (Dow 2000).   
Bernanke (1983) argues that non-monetary effects also contribute to economic 
downturns.  He suggests that the depth and duration of the Great Depression, which are 
not fully explained by changes in the money supply, can be partially explained by the 
non-monetary effects of financial crises.  In particular, Bernanke examines the non-
monetary effects of decreased institutional efficiency and increasingly costly financial 
intermediation. 
Bernanke’s analysis of the Great Depression suggests that bank failures caused 
borrowers to shift to other forms of credit.  As borrowers relied more on trade credit and 
other non-bank lending agencies, the efficiency of the lending process declined since 
these other agencies lacked the banks’ institutional knowledge. The credit system was 
further disrupted by the widespread increase in borrowers’ defaults and bankruptcies.  
Between 1930 and 1933, deflation caused the value of borrowers’ collateral to decrease 
while their debt burden increased.  The increasing spread between Baa-rated corporate 
debt instruments and Treasury bonds indicates that banks found lending to be 
increasingly risky.  Bernanke suggests that the increasing difficulty of obtaining loans, 
even for creditworthy borrowers, limited the ability of the economy to recover from 
macroeconomic shocks. 
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Finally, Bernanke examines whether the increasing costliness of credit 
intermediation affected the supply side or demand side of the economy.  He tests the 
theory that the credit crunch, which was caused by the inability of financial institutions to 
effectively share risk or fund large projects, decreased aggregate supply. Since producers 
did not need to increase the aggregate supply of goods and services during the Great 
Depression, Bernanke argues that this effect was not very important.  Instead, Bernanke 
suggests that increases in the costs of borrowing decreased investment and consumption 
spending, which lowered aggregate demand.  As a result, the financial crisis impacted the 
real economy through changes in consumption and investment.   
Calomiris and Mason (1994) examine another aspect of bank failures.  They note 
that some scholars attribute financial panics to imperfect information, since depositors 
may cause a run on banks when they cannot distinguish between strong and weak 
institutions.16  Depositors seeking to protect their money during a financial crisis may 
withdraw funds from banks until they can pinpoint the troubled institutions.  The deposit 
withdrawals are “socially costly,” disrupt the payment system, and reduce the supply of 
credit (Calomiris and Mason 1994).  However, scholars suggest that interbank 
cooperation normally helps strong banks survive panics since banks have better 
information than depositors regarding the financial condition of other financial 
institutions.17  To test whether banks mutually assisted one another during the Great 
Depression, Calomiris and Mason examine the June 1932 Chicago banking panic. 
                                                 
16 See Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), and Kaufman (1994). 
17 See Gorton (1985), Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Calomiris and Gorton (1991), Calomiris and Schweikart 
(1991), and Calomiris (1993). 
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Calomiris and Mason assess the solvency of financial institutions by examining 
banks’ market-to-book value of equity, their debt, the interest rates paid on debt, and the 
rates of withdrawal of debt during 1931 (Calomiris and Mason 1994).  Banks with higher 
market-to-book values of equity were more likely to survive panics, as were banks with a 
higher proportion of demandable debt.  Calomiris and Mason also find that the interest 
rate paid by failed banks and risky banks was higher than that paid by banks that survived 
the panics.  Finally, banks that failed also experienced a higher withdrawal rate than those 
which survived.  The analysis suggests that banks which survived the panic were 
fundamentally different from those which failed. 
Calomiris and Mason attribute the concentrated bank failures during the Great 
Depression to negative shocks to the value of common assets.  Contagion, or depositors’ 
inability to distinguish solvent banks from insolvent banks, was not a significant factor.  
Calomiris and Mason also find that strong banks continued to cooperate throughout the 
1932 crisis, supporting their hypothesis that interbank lending between sound banks 
remained the norm during the Great Depression.  Calomiris and Mason’s research 
suggests that government aid should support only fundamentally strong and solvent 
banks, as opposed to insolvent institutions.  Their results also support the use of 
government funds to reinforce interbank lending. 
Calomiris and Mason (2000) build on their earlier research by conducting an 
econometric analysis of the factors contributing to bank failures during the Great 
Depression.  They examine banks’ individual characteristics, the possible effects of 
contagion, and the effects of macroeconomic changes including external currency drains 
and agricultural disturbances.  They find that the causes of bank failures vary over time 
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and by region.  As a result, national macroeconomic indicators do not provide a good 
explanation of the timing of bank failures; bank fundamentals prove better predictors of 
bank survival or collapse.   
Calomiris and Mason find some evidence of contagion only in the 1933 bank 
failures.  Prior to that date, their analysis suggests that bank fundamentals and regional 
characteristics are better predictors of bank failure.  Their findings challenge Friedman 
and Schwartz’s (1963) attribution of early Depression-era banking crises to national 
macroeconomic factors.  Calomiris and Mason’s results support Wicker’s (1996) theory 
that regional characteristics were usually more important factors than national contagion.  
The results also support Friedman and Schwartz and Wicker’s shared view that the bank 
failures in 1933 resulted in part from contagion during a nationwide panic. 
Ultimately, Calomiris and Mason (2000) suggest that contagion and liquidity 
crises are not major determinants of bank failures; bank fundamentals are more 
important.  Therefore, a bailout of strong banks might prevent widespread panic, but 
increasing liquidity is unlikely to resolve financial crises like those faced during the Great 
Depression. 
Mason (2001a) conducts an in-depth analysis of the operations of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).  Mason examines the effect of RFC loans 
and preferred stock purchases on Chicago Federal Reserve member banks.  His analysis 
suggests that as the RFC assumed greater default risk, its aid programs more successfully 
limited bank failures.   
Mason finds that the RFC loans alone did not lower bank failure rates.  His 
findings challenge earlier work by Butkiewicz (1995), which suggests that RFC lending 
 19
did reduce bank failures in early 1932-1933.  Mason’s findings are supported by the fact 
that banks were required to use their highest quality and most liquid assets as collateral 
for RFC loans.  Therefore, banks receiving RFC loans were unable to accommodate 
unexpected withdrawals of funds. 
In contrast to the RFC’s unsuccessful loan program, Mason finds evidence that 
the agency’s preferred stock program helped prevent banks from failing.  Under the 
preferred stock program, the RFC bore a greater amount of default risk and made its 
collateral requirements less stringent.  Mason suggests solvent banks could operate more 
efficiently and regain strength as a result of government infusions of capital stock.   
The work of Bernanke, Calomiris, and Mason motivates further research into 
effective government aid programs which can limit bank failures during financial crises.  
These earlier papers analyzed the first three banking crises of the Great Depression; my 
research is the first to explore whether the RFC’s recapitalization program was effective 
in limiting the crisis of 1933, which spread from Detroit, Michigan throughout the United 
States.  The RFC’s program resembles the current bailout plan in that both have two 
provisions: the government may make direct loans to banks, and it may inject additional 
funds by purchasing preferred stock in financial institutions.  An analysis of RFC 
assistance should provide a historical perspective on whether the current bailout plan is 
likely to limit bank failures. 
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Section III: Data and Methodology 
The purpose of this analysis is to measure the effect of the RFC’s loan and 
preferred stock programs on bank failure rates, after controlling for other factors.  The 
models use a cross-sectional set of bank-level data describing RFC loans and preferred 
stock investments in each bank, local economic conditions, individual bank financial 
characteristics, and the incidence and time of bank failure. 
Individual bank financial data come from the Federal Reserve member bank 
Reports of Condition and Income.  From 1929 to 1936, the regulators of state and 
national banks did not publish data on bank earnings and expenses.  Bank-level earning 
and expense data are available in the Reports of Condition and Income of the Federal 
Reserve (Mason 2001a, 1998).  This means that the sample is restricted to Federal 
Reserve member banks.  Federal Reserve banks include both national and state-chartered 
banks, which provides some institutional diversity in the sample.  The sample of banks is 
restricted to the state of Michigan.  There are detailed data on the individual 
characteristics of the troubled financial institutions during the financial crisis of 1933 in 
Detroit as well as the rest of the state.  The database also includes data on the number and 
size of loans each bank received from the RFC.  Michigan banks were also among the 
first to join the RFC’s preferred stock program.  As a result, Michigan banks provide a 
rich data set to examine the impact of this historical experiment. 
The sample includes data on 197 Michigan member banks in the Seventh Federal 
Reserve District.  The bank failure data for the national banks are taken from the 
Comptroller of the Currency’s Annual Report.  The Rand-McNally Bankers’ Directory 
provides the failure data for state banks.  For the purposes of the analysis, receiverships 
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and voluntary liquidations are treated as bank failures, though banks which reopen after 
receivership are not considered failed.  Of the 197 banks in the sample, 82 (42 percent) 
failed between December 1929 and December 1936.  Seventy-eight banks received RFC 
loans, 41 (53 percent) of which failed.  Twenty (34 percent) of the 59 institutions 
participating in the preferred stock program failed.   
RFC loans and preferred stock purchases were hand-coded from the monthly 
Reports of Activities of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.18  The Reports include 
the amount of each loan and preferred stock purchase.  Many banks received multiple 
loans or infusions of capital in the form of preferred stock.  According to Mason (2001a), 
32 percent of banks in the United States received more than one loan from the RFC and 
12 percent borrowed from the government-sponsored entity more than twice.  Previous 
studies have examined the average amount of each loan or preferred stock purchase by 
dividing the amount of each by the number of loans or preferred stock purchases 
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Butkiewicz, 1995; Keehn and Smiley 1988, 1993).  
However, because so many banks received several loans or preferred stock purchases, the 
averages of RFC outlays may be biased downward.  Correcting for the multiple-loan bias, 
Mason (2001a) shows that for Chicago banks involved in the 1932 banking crisis, the 
RFC’s purchases of preferred stock appeared to help banks survive, but RFC loans did 
not.   
                                                 
18 These reports were published when Congress was in session after fall 1932.  The reports were reproduced 
in the Congressional Serial Set and, until 1933, in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.  The Archive 
of the Clerk of the House of Representatives preserved the reports submitted while Congress was in recess 
and remains the only source for these reports. 
Due to complications in obtaining the reports submitted while Congress was in recess, this 
analysis does not include data from September 1935.  However, the limited RFC aid activity throughout the 
fall of 1935 suggests that the additional data would not have a material effect on the results of this analysis. 
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This analysis focuses on whether loans or preferred stock purchases increased the 
likelihood of survival for Michigan banks.  Parametric and non-parametric survival 
analysis techniques illustrate trends in bank failures from December 31, 1929 to 
December 31, 1936.19  The Kaplan-Meier survivor functions depict bank failures over 
time.  Smoothed hazard functions depict shifts in the probability of failure over time.  
Finally, a probit model and a log-logistic survivor model are employed to examine the 
effect of aid allocations on bank failure rates within a multiple regression framework.  
The formal econometric analysis suggests that RFC loans decreased the likelihood and 
duration of bank survival, whereas direct recapitalization increased the likelihood of bank 
survival. 
Methods and Empirical Results 
Survival analysis techniques are superior to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regressions or binary dependent variable regressions (logit and probit) at capturing the 
relationship between RFC aid allocations and failure rates over a specific time period.  
OLS produces misleading results when analyzing censored data, truncated data, or time-
varying covariates (Jenkins 2005).  Furthermore, OLS models present a structural issue:  
they simply do not express results in terms of observed transitions between states or 
completed spells (Jenkins 2005).  Binary dependent variable models, which address the 
censoring and structural issues introduced by OLS, do not address “the differences in 
time in which each person is at risk of experiencing the event” (Jenkins 2005).  The 
statistical techniques used in survival analysis were developed to address “the sequential 
nature of the data, and are able to handle censoring and incorporate time-varying 
                                                 
19 Non-parametric means that “no prior assumptions are made about the shapes of the relevant functions” 
(Jenkins 2005). 
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covariates” (Jenkins 2005).  As a result, survival analysis allows us to incorporate the 
most information in our study of the relationship between RFC aid policies and bank 
failure rates. 
The specification of survival models depends on whether the process occurs in 
continuous time, or in discrete time intervals.  Most economic phenomena are observed 
in continuous time.  However, the data describing spell lengths are likely presented in 
grouped form.  For example, durations are expressed in days or hours, not as fractions 
thereof.  The length of the intervals used relative to average spell length helps determine 
whether the data should be treated as discrete or continuous (Jenkins 2005).  In the case 
of the bank survival times in this data set, duration is measured in days and the typical 
bank survives for a period of years.  Therefore, the survival time data used in this analysis 
is treated as if it were continuous.  
Both graphical and multiple regression techniques are used to analyze the failure 
rates of Michigan banks.  Kaplan-Meier survivor functions and smoothed hazard 
functions graphically describe the failure rates of the entire sample of Michigan banks, 
and the failure rates of subgroups determined by aid type.  We then present a probit 
model of bank failures as a straightforward introduction to the relationship between RFC 
aid allocations and failure rates.  To demonstrate the specific effects of different 
covariates on bank failure rates over time, we use a log-logistic survival model.  The log-
logistic parameterization assumes a specific shape for the survival function based on the 
history of bank failures during the Great Depression.  
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Survivor and Hazard Functions 
 Figure 1 is an estimate of the survival function of all Michigan banks, derived by 
the Kaplan-Meier method (Appendix I).20  The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival 
function “is given by the product of one minus the number of exits divided by the number 
of [entities] at risk of exit” (Jenkins 2005).21  From the survival function, one can also 
estimate the integrated hazard and failure functions of a population.  These functions are 
typically depicted as step functions, where the height of each step varies depending on 
the estimated survival function, and the width of each step varies depending on the times 
at which failures occurred.  The shape of the function reflects the fact that the non-
parametric Kaplan-Meier method depends on the dates of observed transitions between 
states and on the length of the largest non-censored survival time.22  Smoothing the 
function would demand additional assumptions about failure rates at dates between 
within-sample failure times and beyond the maximum observed failure time (Jenkins 
2005). 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of banks in business each day from December 31, 
1929 to December 31, 1936.  Figure 1 also indicates important historical events related to 
bank failure rates, including (1) the onset of the crisis of 1933, (2) when the RFC 
commenced operations, and (3) the beginning of the major bank liquidations caused by 
                                                 
20 In each of the estimated survival functions and estimated hazard functions, the population at risk is all 
banks in the sample.   
21 The proportion of those entering a state who survive to the first observed survival time, t1, S(t1), is simply 
one minus the proportion who made a transition out of the state by that time, where the latter can be 
estimated by the number of exits divided by the number who were at risk of transition: d1/(d1+m1)=d1/n1.  
More generally, at survival time tj, (Jenkins 2005). 
22 “A survival time is censored if all that is known is that it began or ended within some particular interval 
of time, and thus the total spell length (from entry time until transition) is not known exactly” (Jenkins 
2005). 
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the crisis of 1933.  The survivor function shows that bank liquidations increased 
dramatically following the crisis of 1933.  Figure 1 shows that the RFC liquidated failed 
banks for eighteen months following the crisis.  After 1934, liquidations virtually ceased.  
The smoothed hazard estimate in Figure 2 offers additional evidence that the Crisis of 
1933 threatened banks across Michigan.23  The hazard ratio for bank failure reaches its 
highest point as the RFC completes the liquidations of banks that failed during the crisis 
of 1933.   
Figures 3 and 4 divide the sample between banks which received RFC loans and 
banks in which the RFC bought preferred stock.  Figure 3 shows that a greater proportion 
of the banks which received loans failed, relative to banks which did not receive loans.  
In contrast, a greater proportion of the banks which received capital from the RFC 
survived, relative to banks which did not receive an infusion of funds through preferred 
stock.  Figure 4 shows that if a bank received a loan and preferred stock, it was no more 
likely to survive the Great Depression than if it had received only a loan.  Banks that 
received capital from the RFC were more likely to survive than the banks which received 
no aid.  If the bank received a loan or a loan and stock, it was less likely to survive than 
those banks which received no aid.  Table 1 illustrates these same results (Appendix II).  
                                                 
23  The hazard function is estimated using “kernel-based smoothing of the…change in the cumulative 
hazard between successive failures.  The smoothed value at a given time is based on a weighted average of 
the values in the neighborhood of that point” (Jenkins 2008).  
The shape of the step function used in the Kaplan-Meier estimation means one cannot directly 
estimate the hazard function.  As Jenkins explains, “trying to estimate the slope of the integrated hazard 
function at each of the observed survival times is equivalent to trying to find the slope at the corner of each 
of the steps.  Clearly, the slope is not well-defined…nor [does it yield] a non-parametric estimate of the 
hazard rate” (Jenkins 2005).  However, by smoothing the integrated hazard function, which can be derived 
from the Kaplan-Meier survivor function, one can derive the slope at any point.  Smoothing the hazard 
function incorporates additional assumptions about the data; one must carefully consider the degree to 
which the function should be smoothed and select the smoothing bandwidth accordingly.   
In this analysis, the bandwidths are 28 days.  Richardson and Troost (2006) suggest that “bandwidths of 28 
days on graphs spanning…years…are wide enough to smooth daily volatility without obscuring 
[meaningful] shifts in the probability of failure.” 
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Of all the aid groups, the banks which received capital and no loans from the RFC had 
the largest proportion of survivors by the end of 1936.  Banks which received loans or a 
combination of loans and stock had fewer survivors than the banks which received 
capital. 
 The log-rank and Wilcoxon tests are used to test whether the subgroup differences 
observed in survivor functions are statistically significant (Jenkins 2008).  The log-rank 
and Wilcoxon tests reject the null hypothesis that the survival function for banks which 
received loans equaled that for banks which did not receive loans at the 1 percent level.  
The tests are less robust for preferred stock purchases, however.  The log-rank and 
Wilcoxon tests reject the null hypothesis that the survival function for banks which 
received preferred stock from the RFC equaled that of banks which did not receive a 
capital infusion from the RFC at the 15 percent level and 10 percent level, respectively.  
Finally, the log-rank and Wilcoxon tests reject the null hypothesis that the survival 
function for banks which received loans equaled that of banks which received preferred 
stock at the 1 percent level. 
 The graphs suggest that loans are associated with increased bank failure rates, 
while preferred stock purchases are associated with decreased bank failure rates.  For an 
intuitive examination of the effect of RFC loans and preferred stock purchases relative to 
other bank characteristics, we consider the results of the probit model. 
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Probit Model 
 A probit model is a normally-distributed discrete choice model used to examine 
the percentage of entities entering a state (Greene 1993).  In Table 2, we examine the 
relationship between aid allocations, bank characteristics, and bank failures (Appendix 
II).  RFC aid allocations are represented by binary variables.  The bank characteristics 
selected as determinants of failure have been widely analyzed in the literature (Alston et 
al. 1994; Calomiris and Mason 1997, 2000; Cole and Gunter 1995).   Each bank 
characteristic is included at its value as of December 31, 1931.24  The ratio measuring 
capital adequacy (net worth/total assets) should be associated with lower failure risk.  
Conversely, the less liquid a bank’s assets, the greater its risk of failure.  Real estate 
owned and reported losses indicate the level of foreclosed and nonperforming assets on 
the balance sheet of the bank, and should be associated with higher failure risk.  Bonds, 
stocks, and securities owned, and loans and discounts, suggest the possibility of increased 
credit risk and should be associated with increased risk of failure.  Paper eligible for 
rediscount at the Federal Reserve indicates low credit risk assets and should be associated 
with a decreased risk of bank failure.  Because interest and discount rates should be 
higher for riskier borrowers, interest and discount earnings should be positively related to 
failure risk, assuming the higher earning are the result of higher interest rates charged by 
the banks.  Also, since interest rates were generally declining during the Great 
Depression, interest rate risk on liabilities (bills payable and rediscounts) should have a 
positive relationship to failure rates.  Finally, recoveries, which may capture a sudden 
recovery in bank asset values following a macroeconomic downturn, may also be 
                                                 
24 This analysis uses time-fixed covariates.  Modeling these bank characteristics as time-varying covariates 
might better describe their effect on the likelihood of failure and bank failure rates. 
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positively associated with failure risk25.  Controlling for all of these bank characteristics 
allows us to isolate the effect of RFC loans and preferred stock purchases on bank failure 
rates (Mason 2001a). 
 The relationship between illiquid assets and bank failure rates is positive, as 
expected, and significant in all of the probit regressions in Table 2.  Real estate owned is 
also associated with an increased risk of bank failure and is statistically significant in 
regressions (1), (3), and (4).  None of the other bank characteristics show a significant 
relationship to bank failure rates, though the signs on the coefficients of net worth, bills 
payable and rediscounts, and interest and discount on loans are as expected. 
 RFC loans are positively and significantly related to bank failure.  Preferred stock 
purchases are negatively related to bank failure.  When the banks receive only a direct 
capital infusion from the RFC and do not receive loans (regression 5), the coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant.  Though direct recapitalization does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of failure in regressions (2), (3), and (6), 
the coefficient on preferred stock purchases is always negative.  When both types of RFC 
aid are included in the regression, the variables are not statistically significant.  However, 
the coefficients still indicate a positive relationship between RFC loans and failure, and a 
negative relationship between RFC preferred stock purchases and failure.  When the 
variables are examined using a Wald test, we find that the loan and preferred stock 
purchase variables are jointly significant.   
Table 3 shows the marginal effects of RFC loans and preferred stock purchases.  
Banks receiving loans are approximately 25% more likely to fail, holding other 
                                                 
25 Mason (2001a) notes, “recoveries may be positively associated with failure risk, if they capture a 
rebound in bank asset values following a trough.” 
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characteristics constant (regressions 1 and 3).  However, banks in which the RFC 
purchased preferred stock are less likely to fail.  A bank receiving only stock, and no loan 
from the RFC (regression 5), has a 27% lower risk of failure.   
 While the probit model allows us to examine the relationship between bank 
characteristics, RFC aid allocations, and the probability of bank failure, it is not sensitive 
to the timing of bank failure rates and leads to inaccurate results.  We are interested in 
when banks failed; therefore, we estimate an accelerated failure time model to examine 
the effect of RFC aid on bank failure rates.  
Accelerated Failure Time Model 
 In contrast to a probit model, which represents only whether banks failed, a model 
of accelerated failure time uses the time before failure as the dependent variable.  These 
survival models therefore measure how covariates “affect the incidence of failure… [and] 
the length of time elapsed before failure” (Mason 2001a).  Also, survival models, which 
measure the conditional probability of failure, adjust for the survivorship bias inherent in 
the unconditional probabilities of failure estimated by probit models (Kiefer 1988).  The 
survival model selected for this analysis uses the log-logistic function to parameterize the 
model.  This parameterization was selected because its non-monotonic hazard function 
accurately describes the expected shape of the baseline survival rate of the sample over 
time.  We expect the rate of bank failures to increase initially because of the repeated 
financial crises which occurred between 1930 and 1933.  Following the crisis of 1933, the 
rate of bank failures should decrease. 
 Table 4 summarizes the accelerated failure time models used to examine the 
relationship between binary variables representing RFC aid, bank characteristics, and 
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survival time (Appendix II).  The unit of observation is the individual bank, and duration 
is measured in days.  Banks are observed from December 31, 1929 until December 31, 
1936.  The coefficients on each covariate are time ratios.  Time ratios less than 1 are 
associated with a shorter estimated survival time; time ratios greater than 1 are associated 
with a longer estimated survival time.  The bank characteristics modeled are the same as 
those used in the probit analysis.   
As in the probit analysis, illiquid assets are significantly negatively related to 
survival time.  None of the other bank characteristics demonstrate a significant effect on 
survival time; however, the sign of the coefficients of certain variables supports our 
earlier hypotheses.  Bonds, stocks, and securities owned are associated with shorter 
survival time.  Bills payable and rediscounts and interest and discount on loans are also 
associated with a shorter estimated survival time.  Bank size (net worth) is associated 
with a longer estimated survival time. 
RFC loans and preferred stock purchases are significant in every regression.  RFC 
loans are associated with shorter estimated survival times, while preferred stock 
purchases are associated with longer survival times.  A bank receiving only preferred 
stock, and no RFC loans, has the longest estimated survival time.  While the time ratios 
are significant at the 10 percent level or higher for every aid variable, the Wald test for 
joint significance suggests that the relationship between RFC loans and RFC preferred 
stock purchases could be even stronger than our regression results imply. 
The results of the log-logistic regressions correspond with the results of the non-
parametric survival analysis and the results of the probit model.  In each case, RFC loans 
are associated with decreased survival.  In contrast, RFC preferred stock purchases are 
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associated with increased survival.  Mason (2001a) suggests the negative relationship 
between loans and bank survival is due to the RFC’s onerous collateral requirements.  
Historians corroborate this interpretation.  James notes: 
High collateral requirements forced [banks] to isolate their most liquid assets as 
security for RFC loans.  In April 1932, for example, the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation loaned the Reno National Bank over $1,100,000, but in the process 
took as collateral over $3,000,000 of the bank’s best securities.  This in itself left 
the bank unable to meet any future emergency demands for funds by depositors 
(1938). 
The banks subordinated the interests of their shareholders to the government when they 
obtained a RFC loan.  Mason (2001a) hypothesizes that investors might have chosen to 
close the bank in order to reduce their losses.  He also suggests that depositors could have 
run on the banks in hopes of keeping their assets from the RFC. 
Preferred stock purchases of the RFC carried no collateral requirements.  The 
government bore a considerable share of the risk of bank failure, and it did not 
subordinate the claims of existing creditors or equity holders.  The positive relationship 
between preferred stock purchases and bank survival supports the idea that high collateral 
requirements and the subordination of other stakeholders caused the loan program to fail 
in its objective of helping banks. 
While this analysis did not find bank characteristics to have a significant effect on 
survival, these characteristics were entered as time-fixed covariates26.  If they were 
                                                 
26 Bank characteristics were analyzed as of December 31, 1931. 
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tracked over time, prior research indicates they would prove significant (Calomiris and 
Mason 2000, Mason 2001a). 
Section IV: Conclusion 
 Do bank bailouts work? Policymakers and the financial press have spent a 
considerable amount of time trying to address this question in the wake of the current 
financial crisis.  Determining the efficacy of recent aid initiatives is complicated because 
the government has not intervened in financial markets on this scale in the post-World 
War II period. Fortunately, the operations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
provide a historical experiment to examine the effects of government loan and preferred 
stock programs on distressed financial institutions.  The effects of RFC loans and 
preferred stock purchases provide insight into whether the current aid policies will help 
prevent bank failures and reduce the costs of financial disintermediation. 
My empirical analysis suggests three conclusions. First, loans from the RFC did 
not help banks survive the Great Depression, but direct recapitalizations in the form of 
preferred stock did increase the likelihood of bank survival. One explanation for this 
result is that banks were required to use some of their best assets as collateral to receive 
loans from the RFC. Second, the preferred stock program did not burden the bank with 
heavy collateral requirements or subordinate the claims of other stakeholders.  Direct 
recapitalization allowed banks to operate more efficiently and improved their chances of 
surviving the Great Depression by repairing their balance sheets. 
The results suggest that policymakers should allow the government to assume a 
substantial share of the risk of bank failure if they want to rescue the financial system.  
The government could assume this risk by directly recapitalizing the banks with equity 
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purchases, or by granting loans without heavy collateral requirements.  Using its power 
as a shareholder or major creditor, the government can ensure that bank managers 
implement beneficial changes and improve oversight in their firms.  Such direct 
intervention will restore public confidence in troubled institutions and allow the banks to 
operate efficiently.  As the institutions stabilize, the government can gradually return 
control to private stakeholders and recover the funds provided by taxpayers. 
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Appendix I: Figures 
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function 
This model represents the percentage of banks in business in Michigan between December 31, 1929 and December 31, 1936.  Bank 
failure data are from the Comptroller of the Currency’s Annual Report and the Rand-McNally Bankers’ Directory. 
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Figure 2. Smoothed hazard estimate of all Michigan banks 
This model represents the hazard ratio at a given point in time, derived by calculating the change in the cumulative hazard between successive 
failures.  Bank failure data are from the Comptroller of the Currency’s Annual Report and the Rand-McNally Bankers’ Directory. 
Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function for sample subgroups 
This model represents the percentage of banks in business, stratified by the type of aid received.  Bank 
failures are measured between December 31, 1929 and December 31, 1936.  Bank failure data are from the 
Comptroller of the Currency’s Annual Report and the Rand-McNally Bankers’ Directory. 
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Figure 4. Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function for sample subgroups 
This model represents the percentage of banks in business, stratified by the type of aid received.  The banks which received RFC loans, 
the banks in which the RFC purchased preferred stock, and the banks which received loans and direct capital infusions via preferred 
stock are shown on the same graph for comparison.  Bank failures are measured between December 31, 1929 and December 31, 1936.  
Bank failure data are from the Comptroller of the Currency’s Annual Report and the Rand McNally Bankers’ Directory. 
  
 
Appendix II: Tables 
Survivor estimates, stratified by subgroup
Time (Days) Preferred stock only Preferred stock Loan Loan only No Aid
531 100 100 99 98 100
789 100 100 96 95 99
1047 100 100 95 92 92
1305 100 100 91 87 89
1563 83 80 64 60 82
1821 78 66 47 47 72
2079 78 66 47 47 72
2337 78 66 47 47 71
2595 78 66 47 47 70
Table 1. Survivor estimates, stratified by subgroup
This table lists the survivor function estimates for each RFC aid subgroup.  Survivor rates are expressed as percentages.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank failure equation
Constant -2.943 -2.178 -2.804 -2.370 -2.621 -2.602
(0.25) (1.95) (2.03) (1.97) (1.99) (2.01)
Loan binary      0.652** ---      0.672** --- --- ---
(0.48) (0.30)
Preferred stock binary --- -3.128 -0.356 --- ---
(0.30) (0.31)
Loan only binary --- --- ---  0.659* --- 0.511
(0.344) (0.36)
Preferred stock only binary --- --- ---    ---     -0.697** -0.536
(0.37) (0.38)
Illiquid assets/total assets    4.159*      4.445**    4.318*    3.882*      4.931**    4.459*
(2.22) (2.22) (2.26) (2.21) (2.30) (2.32)
Bonds, stocks, and securities owned/illiquid assets -0.537 -0.982 -0.690 -0.720 -0.970 -0.842
(1.40) (1.39) (1.41) (1.39) (1.39) (1.40)
Real estate owned/illiquid assets 24.430* 17.772 23.893* 23.423* 18.090 22.067
(14.34) (12.97) (13.99) (13.88) (13.06) (13.63)
Loans and discounts/illiquid assets -0.377 -0.580 -0.440 -0.499 -0.535 -0.508
(0.95) (0.93) (0.97) (0.95) (0.945) (0.96)
Paper eligible for rediscount at the Fed/loans and discounts 0.369 0.282 0.213 0.183 0.313 0.159
(1.19) (1.17) (1.20) (1.18) (1.18) (1.19)
Net worth/total assets -3.492 -5.249 -3.759 -4.109 -4.951 -4.275
(4.08) (3.98) (4.12) (4.04) (4.00) (4.07)
Bills payable and rediscounts/debt 2.973 2.110 1.800 1.891 2.054 1.315
(3.92) (4.01) (4.07) (3.95) (3.98) (4.01)
Interest and discount on loans/total earnings 0.083 0.093 0.194 0.122 0.167 0.227
(1.08) (1.10) (1.08) (1.09) (1.10) (1.09)
Recoveries/total earnings -0.203 -0.321 -0.439 -0.135 -0.584 -0.534
(2.91) (2.95) (2.95) (2.96) (2.92) (2.97)
Losses/total expenses -0.119 -0.030 -0.096 -0.008 -0.123 -0.066
(0.77) (0.75) (0.77) (0.77) (0.75) (0.77)
Log-likelihood -54.39 -56.39 -53.72 -55.03 -55.05 -54.02
Chi-squared (k-1 df) 20.47** 16.47 21.80** 19.19* 19.15* 21.21**
Number of banks with RFC authorization of each type 41 38 --- 23 20 ---
Wald test for joint significance --- --- 6.13** --- --- 5.55*
Number of observations (banks) 94
Number of failures 52
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Table 2. Probit model of RFC discount loans and preferred stock purchases 
Each model estimates the determinants of bank failure from December 31, 1929 to December 31, 1936.  Bank financial data are from Federal Reserve Reports of 
Condition and Income .  RFC loan and preferred stock data are from monthly Reports of Activity of the RFC .  Standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal effects
Loan binary     0.250** ---     0.257** --- ---
(0.11) (0.11) ---
Preferred stock binary --- -0.123 -0.140 --- --- ---
(0.12) (0.12)
Loan only binary --- --- ---     0.244** --- 0.193
(0.12) (0.13)
Preferred stock only binary --- --- --- ---    -0.272** -0.211
(0.14) (0.15)
Log-likelihood -54.39 -56.39 -53.72 -55.03 -55.05 -54.02
Chi-squared (k-1 df) 20.47** 16.47 21.80** 19.19* 19.15* 21.21**
Number of banks with RFC authorization of each type 41 38 --- 23 20 ---
Wald test for joint significance --- --- 6.13** --- --- 5.55*
Number of observations (banks) 94
Number of failures 52
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Table 3. Marginal effects of RFC discount loans and preferred stock purchases in probit model 
RFC loan and preferred stock data coefficients express the percentage change in the likelihood of failure when aid is received.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time Ratio
Loan binary      0.783** ---       0.777*** ---
(0.48) (0.81)
Preferred stock binary ---    1.217*   1.232*
(0.14) (0.14)
Loan only binary --- --- ---     0.795**
(0.10)
Preferred stock only binary --- --- ---    1.267*
(0.17)
Illiquid assets/total assets       0.124***       0.118***       0.117***       0.116***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Bonds, stocks, and securities owned/illiquid assets  1.041  1.189  1.045  1.055
(0.56) (0.64) (0.55) (0.55)
 Real estate owned/illiquid assets  0.024  0.019  0.021  0.020
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
 Loans and discounts/illiquid assets  1.175  1.2655  1.251  1.262
(0.43) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44)
 Paper eligible for rediscount at the Fed/loans and discounts  0.941  0.975  1.045  1.053
(0.43) (0.45) (0.46) (0.47)
 Net worth/total assets    8.114  17.132    9.909  10.648
(13.72) (29.31) (16.38) (17.45)
 Bills payable and rediscounts/debt  0.098  0.195  0.176  0.191
(0.17) (0.33) (0.30) (0.32)
Interest and discount on loans/total earnings  0.802  0.775  0.727  0.721
(0.36) (0.34) (0.32) (0.317)
Recoveries/total earnings  1.089  1.224  1.218  1.236
(1.31) (1.59) (1.45) (1.48)
Losses/total expenses  1.071  1.002  1.072  1.068
(0.30) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30)
Log-likelihood    -64.69    -65.81    -62.93    -62.98
Chi-squared (k-1 df)     24.10***     21.87**     27.62***     27.53***
Number of banks with RFC authorization of each type 41 38 ---
Loans: 23 
Stock: 20
Wald test for joint significance --- ---       8.83***       8.71***
Number of observations (banks) 94
Number of failures 52
*, **, *** Statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Table 4.   Accelaterated failure time models with RFC loans and preferred stock purchases
Each model measures the determinants of log survival time, measured in days, from December 31, 1929 to December 31, 1936.  All 
survival models use a log-logistic parameterization.  Time ratios less than one are associated with a shorter estimated survival time; 
time ratios greater than one are associated with a longer estimated survival time.  Bank financial data are from the Federal Reserve 
Reports of Condition and Income.  RFC loan and preferred stock information are from monthly Reports of Activity of the RFC.  
Standard errors are in parentheses.
